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COMMENT ON MEANS TESTING CONSUMER

BANKRUPTCY BY JEAN BRAUCHER
EricA. Posner*
Jean Braucher's article usefully describes the many
complexities of the pending consumer bankruptcy legislation, and
performs a valuable service by tracing out its implications for the
consumer bankruptcy system.' I agree that the legislation has
problems and is far from ideal, but I like some aspects of it, and
was unsure of the basis of Professor Braucher's critique. In
particular, I did not understand her praise for the current system,
or the source of her conviction that the pending bankruptcy
legislation could only make things worse.'
Our disagreement might stem from the unfortunate use of
highly moralistic terms in the current policy debate, terms that
Professor Braucher accepts uncritically. Academics and politicians
alike provoke emotional responses by depicting the participants in
" Professor of Law, University of Chicago. The author wishes to thank
the Sarah
Scaife Foundation Fund and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Fund for
their generous financial support.
1. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.
333, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001].
2. See generally Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The
Problem of Means, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407 (2002).
3. Id. at 408 (stating that the Bankruptcy Reform act "would make access to
bankruptcy more difficult, imposing new hurdles and costs for all and thus pricing
the worst off out of the system"); see also id. at 433-43 (outlining the new
provisions in the pending bankruptcy legislation and noting problems with the
propositions, such as increased cost (including attorney fees), increased filing
requirements, and increased duties for U.S. Trustees,); id. at 445 ("The
bankruptcy bureaucracy would swell.").
4. Id. at 407 (stating that "the current system already effectively screens out
most of those who do not belong in it"); see also id. at 408 ("Chapter 7 works
reasonably well to give distressed debtors a fresh start."). But see id. at 412
("Certainly, improvements in consumer bankruptcy law could be made."); see
also id. at 447-54 (discussing other options to the pending bankruptcy legislation).
5. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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the credit market and the bankruptcy system as composites of
offensive (or attractive) characteristics. These composites serve
the same purpose as roles in medieval morality plays: they embody
vices we loathe or virtues that we respect. The common story is
this:
Debtor
Moral Intuition

Characters

People should be responsible
and pay their debts.

The spendthrift
The rich person who parks
assets in a Florida homestead

We should forgive people who
suffer through of their own.

The divorced woman with no
skills
The parents of a sick child

Creditor
Moral Intuition

Characters

People should not make money
off the misery of others.

Deceptive credit card
companies

There is no morally positive story for the creditor, even though
we would all be lost if credit were not available; the reason is just
that creditors make money and do not try to hide that fact. The
rhetorical battle thus focuses on the characterization of the debtor
as parasite or victim.
This debate quickly becomes one about whether debtors file
for bankruptcy in order to abuse the system (as parasites) or to
escape hardships (as victims). The bankruptcy filing rate is taken
as a sign of moral and social decay (if debtors are parasites) or of a
well-functioning safety net (if debtors are victims). The debt level
is also taken as a sign of aggregate irresponsibility (if debtors are
parasites) or the evil practices of lenders (if debtors are victims). A
sterile empirical debate ensues about whether the debt level and

2002]

COMMENT ON JEAN BRA UCHER

459

bankruptcy rate are too "high," and whether trends are due to
moral decay, bad behavior by creditors, or (as is most likely, and as
Professor Braucher acknowledges) shifts in the technologies of
credit and the legal regulation of the credit market.6
Much progress would be made in bankruptcy reform if this
moral posturing were abandoned, and policymakers focused on the
relevant consideration, namely, how much debtors should be
forced to pay in the form of higher interest rates, or in the
withdrawal of credit, for the right to escape repayment of their
loans. The cost of any bankruptcy system takes the form of higher
interest rates for all debtors. The benefit is the ex post prevention
of hardship. I say "ex post" because by raising the cost of credit,
bankruptcy also creates "ex ante" hardship for people who as a
consequence cannot borrow money. It is not at all clear that the
current balancing of these benefits and costs is correct, and I do not
understand why Professor Braucher believes otherwise.
The pending legislation implicitly assumes a status quo in
which people pay more for the bankruptcy safety net than they
would want to, and addresses this problem by making bankruptcy
less attractive. It makes bankruptcy less attractive in two ways: (1)
by creating paperwork requirements, exposing sloppy lawyers to
sanctions,8 and so forth; and (2) by creating a means test.9 The first
appears to be directed toward lower income debtors; the second
toward higher income debtors. Professor Braucher focuses entirely
on the ex post costs of these requirements," and she is right to
stress them, but that, of course, is their whole point. If the purpose

6. Braucher, supra note 3, at 422 (stating that it is plausible that interest rate
deregulation prompted more lending, and more lending meant more overburdened debtors finding their way to bankruptcy).
7. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, supra note 1, § 102 (requiring a
debtor to submit a means test calculation); see also id. § 315(b) (discussing
debtors filing requirements); id. § 315(e)(2) (requiring debtor to submit tax
returns when filing for bankruptcy).
8. Id. § 102 (including sanctions such as payment for the costs of a dismissal
action, attorneys' fees, and a civil penalty).
9. Id.
10. Braucher, supra note 2, at 412 (asserting that reducing access to
bankruptcy would likely lead to the expansion of the high-risk, high-cost credit
market, which would also increase the social problem of over-indebtedness).
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of the law is to make bankruptcy more difficult, it does not make
sense to criticize it for making bankruptcy more difficult.
To assess the pending legislation, we need to address two
questions: (a) is the current bankruptcy system too generous, and
(b) if so, are there better ways of making it less attractive.
Professor Braucher focuses on (a), claiming without any
explanation that there is too much debt already, and so society
would be better off with less. 1 If that is true, however, there are
more direct ways of reducing the debt load: taxing the extension of
credit would be sensible and equitable as well. What is true is that
it is hard to know what the proper balance is. I would be more
persuaded of the need for bankruptcy reform legislation if interest
rates on credit cards had zoomed above their historic averages, or
if credit card companies started withdrawing credit. But in any
event this is a complex question about which I have nothing to say.
As for (b), this is a more interesting question for bankruptcy
policy. Suppose we want to reduce the amount of nonpayment of
debt. 2 Limiting exemptions turns out to be politically difficult, and
in addition, there are some good reasons for deferring to the states.
Limiting the discharge means requiring debtors to pay creditors
out of a portion of their future income. The means-testing
provision has just this effect: by restricting access to Chapter 7 it
encourages debtors to file a plan under Chapter 13, a plan that
distributes future disposable income to creditors.
The benefit of this system is that it makes human capital
accessible to creditors. Creditors will lend more, and at a lower
interest rate, if they can obtain some portion of the future income
of defaulting debtors.'3 Debtors will not suffer too much hardship
ex post as long as they retain enough future income to live on. By
11. Braucher, supra note 2, at 424-29 (discussing the causes of overindebtedness and how reducing access to bankruptcy will only increase debt
levels).
12. This does not necessarily mean that we want to reduce the bankruptcy
filing rate! That is not the economically relevant variable.
13. Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical
Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 591 (2000) ("When an insolvent borrower can
trade future income for current assets, the creditor's expected insolvency state
payoff increases, and this in a competitive credit market will reduce the interest
rate.").
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treating non-human and human capital more equally, the reformed
bankruptcy system would discourage inefficient substitutions: the
person who sells non-exempt revenue-generating assets in order to
finance an education that will produce discharge-protected income.
This is not to say that the new system is ideal. By taxing all
non-disposable income, Chapter 13 reduces the incentive of
debtors to work during the pendency of the plan. 4 Many people
have criticized Chapter 13 for this effect," and it probably ought to
be changed. But by bringing human capital into the bankruptcy
system, the pending legislation moves in the right direction.
Another problem with limiting discharge is that for lower
income individuals the amounts at stake are too small to be worth
the cost of monitoring the Chapter 13 plan. This, I take it, is the
reason for limiting the "abuse" test to higher income debtors, and
using paperwork and other costly requirements in order to deter
lower income debtors. The effect of these requirements is
predictable: people whose earning power is low enough will not file
for bankruptcy, nor will people whose debt burden is relatively
low. These people are filtered out, leaving debtors whose debt
burdens are more serious and pressing. Unfortunately, for the
filtering to work, these hard-pressed debtors need to bear the
increased filing costs.
After some experimenting with the system, we might conclude
that the increased hardship is not worth the benefit - the predicted
reduction in the cost of credit for poorer people. That might be the
case, but it is an empirical question, not one that can be answered
14. Accord Harry L. Deffebach, PostconfirmationModification of Chapter13
Plans: A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing, 9 BANKR. DEv. J. 153, 169 (1992) ("The
Fourth Circuit recognized that some individuals might be discouraged from
working harder if the court distributed the extra wages to their creditors.").
15. See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934) (written by
Judge Sutherland); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-State Policy in Bankruptcy
Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1434 (1985).
Thus, to say that human capital is in existence at the time of bankruptcy does
not mean that creditors are entitled to claim any of the debtor's measurable
future income as an existing asset, for some of that income will depend on
future efforts by the debtor - efforts over which the creditors will have no
control and that society will never require.
Id. But see Deffebach, supra note 14, at 168-69 (stating that it is unfair to allow a
debtor to improve his financial outlook without compensating past creditors).
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in the abstract, and not one that benefits from moralistic posturing.

